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INTRODUCTION
The key question explored in this paper was raised by a reading of the popular historian Kate Summerscale's recreation of the late Victorian scandal of Robert Coombes, a thirteen-yearold boy acquitted of murdering his mother on grounds of insanity.
1 In reading and writing the 1895 trial using surviving trial documents, family and institutional papers, and accounts in the press, Summerscale described how Coombes' behaviour, actions that were unusual, deeply shocking and difficult to explain at the time, was made explicable by locating him as a 'new boy'. Like the 'new woman' of the period, the 'new boy' reflected novel ideas about adolescence in child development theory and an associated market of goods, from books to clothing, targeting this youth. In particular was a swathe of 'penny bloods', short periodicals for young men that sold them stories of daring do and adventure, often overseas and in the colonies. 2 Coombes' behaviour, the press explained, was driven by a desire to leave home, to adventure in the world, and to cut his ties to a mother who limited these ambitions. Others speculated his actions were underpinned by the degeneracy that concerned observers noted afflicted the lower orders of the period.
The prosecution's narrative of the unscrupulous 'new boy' was not entirely successful, however, as Coombes was found insane, a decision informed by testimony that he had long-term headaches that potentially caused a short mental break. The story that was not told, but which Summerscale found hinted at in some news accounts, was that of child abuse.
A modern reader of the trial documents, including the boy and his brother's accounts of their home life, would find several 'red flags' suggestive of physical abuse and neglect, and very possibly sexual abuse of Robert by his mother. Yet, as Summerscale notes, this possibility was not raised in legal argument. Whether it was felt wrong to speak ill of the dead, or Crime, Madness and Sensation, Aldershot, 2004, 45-58. because a murderous son was not tied in the popular or psychological imagination of the period to child abuse, this narrative went unspoken in court and largely in the media too. It is one that a modern reader, primed by our Freudian heritage, would struggle to ignore, just as Summerscale could not.
That the stories available to be told in court are shaped by the conventions, legal, social and cultural, of the period has now been well charted by social and legal historians.
Historians of criminal intent, for example, have argued that during the eighteenth century a wider range of 'mental states' were made available to excuse criminal behaviour. Dana Rabin highlights how defences of mental distress, temporary 'phrenzy', necessity, drunkenness, and compulsion expanded the mitigating circumstances on offer to juries in England and Wales. 3 Martin Wiener charts the contraction of some of these options in the nineteenth century as courts and the public placed more emphasis on self-control, particularly for men. 4 Work on
Scotland argues that such shifts were less marked, as a culture of manly emotional control was significant across the eighteenth century. 5 Moving back in time, Garthine Walker describes how explanations for parricide moved from sin to psychology over the early modern period, as 'selfish' children motivated by greed were replaced by portraits of the 3 Dana Y. Rabin, Identity, Crime, and Legal Responsibility in Eighteenth-Century England, Houndmills, 2004. What this literature suggests, as does the Coombes case, is that if there are histories of the expansion and retraction of forms of evidence and legal narratives available to criminal defendants or other actors in the legal system, then there are also stories untold, gaps in legal narratives, or narratives of self unavailable to people at particular historical points. Such gaps produce tensions within the legal system and its representations in culture. Francis Dolan, and other early modernists, have lamented the absence of personal motivation in the representation of early modern domestic crime as a result of the focus on sin and morality. 8 I have highlighted the ways that, for 'unimaginable' crimes such as parricide, eighteenthcentury Scots often combined competing narratives in their legal depositions -from sin, to greed, to bad character, to anger -in an attempt to find resolution in the fullness of competing explanations, if not in independent variables -a technique that drew attention to the constructed nature of such explanations. 9 Yet, despite acknowledgement of the stories left untold, how fissures in courtroom narratives shape courtroom dynamics is relatively understudied.
This paper explores the gap in narrative formed when emotion is ignored during trials for women accused of murdering their husbands in early-nineteenth-century Ireland, with a particular focus on the 1842 Dublin trial of Mrs Ellen Byrne. A developing scholarship on legal emotions has sought to challenge older conceptions of the law as a purely rational process. Such work highlights the emotions of actors in courts or legal processes, from witnesses to the judiciary; it reflects on the emotional component of legal problems or the, sometimes unspoken, emotions shaping legal precedent and doctrine; it highlights research on the role of emotion in cognition and its implications for legal decision-making, and much more. 10 In a scholarship invested in putting emotion back into the law, a discussion of its absence may seem counterproductive. Yet, as I argue and as the Byrne case highlights, the absence of emotion also produces a story, one that in this instance was unsatisfactory for a jury who, I suggest, required emotion to interpret the case and to produce a conclusive narrative around the events leading to Augustine Byrne's death. In doing so, I contribute to a wider scholarship within critical legal studies that reflects on the courtroom as, not just a legal, but a social and cultural practice. 11 My focus is on narrative and storytelling, I engage in a wider conversation about how the law -as a human activity performed in courts -both As importantly, the growing significance of the appearance of justice to the law's legitimacy encouraged the court to co-operate with journalists, to provide space for the public in large galleries, and to articulate the law as something transparent and corresponding to 'common sense' ideas of fairness, rather than an obtuse application of legal principle. 19 Those who recorded court proceedings were expected to record events accurately and impartially -those who did not could face significant censure in the press.
20
In an era before professional journalists, the men who performed such work varied from those who saw themselves as 'publishers' to freelancers, who used it as a mechanism 17 The UK lower courts still do not make transcripts or recordings of courtroom proceedings. and by the narrative structure of court reporting.
24
Much court reporting is inherently conservative, selecting witness testimony and descriptions of behaviour that lead the reader to understand the jury decision or judicial outcome. This leads the reader to the impression that justice was done, reinforcing the legitimacy of the legal system, whilst perhaps also giving insight into the key pieces of evidence or events in court that had been taken into account by judges and juries when coming to their decisions. Of course, not all jury verdicts were unanimous, nor did judges and juries always agree with each other, but that journalists were able to provide useful explanatory narratives for verdicts suggests that their perspective was not too far different claim that everyone in court agreed with or was happy about particular verdicts; reports often recount such discontent and provide narratives to help explain it. There appears to have been a general level of satisfaction with the quality of trial reporting. They were sometimes used by the judiciary in legal reports where other notes did not exist. Moreover the key role that journalists were understood to play in shaping courtroom dynamics (ensuring the good behaviour of all present and so the application of justice) provides a level of confidence in the quality of these as sources for events in court.
25
This approach to interpreting trials treats the courtroom as a holistic space, which is important given that it is unlikely that the outcome of any trial is determined by one variable alone. There is a considerable historiography exploring the impact of lawyers on trial processes and the motivations of juries -highlighting for example that juries were reluctant to find guilty verdicts in capital cases, particularly in Ireland -that feeds into an interpretation of courtroom dynamics. 26 It is also well recognized that 'the law' provides a felt it played in shaping the outcome of the trial. Reports of judges' charges that clarify the law help readers understand what was legally at stake. The emphasis they place on displays of emotion and barristers' and judges' discussions of them are highly suggestive of their cultural and legal significance. Given that most reports balance speeches with witness testimony and descriptions of the bodies and behaviours of courtroom actors however, weighting different components of the trial for their impact using this source material is challenging. Rather court-reporting aims to weave together multiple threads to build a coherent narrative for the reader with a satisfying outcome; it is an attempt to impose order on the messiness of human experience, much as juries and judges attempted to do with their verdicts, and much as historians try to do when producing tales of the past. As this suggests, my focus on the role emotion plays in these stories is not a claim that they are always the only explanatory factor shaping the outcome of the trial; rather it is to argue that attending to emotion can contribute to a fuller understanding of how justice was produced in courtrooms.
Importantly, it is notable that this was something that contemporaries themselves were concerned with, often devoting considerable space to descriptions of emotion and allowing such descriptions to hold explanatory force in trial accounts. As is explored below, this public interest also reflects the significance of emotion to the 'logic' of the law.
II. NARRATIVIZING EMOTION; EMOTION AS EVIDENCE
An effective prosecution in a criminal trial typically depends upon the ability of the prosecution to take disparate pieces of evidence and traces of everyday life and to construct them into a coherent narrative of events that demonstrates the culpability of the defendant. As a result, the courtroom and its actors become implicated in its production of legal narratives. This can include physical architecture, the bodies of prosecutors, defendants, witnesses, lawyers, the judiciary and other legal actors, their clothing and behaviour, the effective use of speech and rhetoric, legal procedure and rules of evidence, and a host of other factors. 33 Such 'evidences' can disrupt or affirm the prosecution's narrative, which may also compete with alternative narratives produced by the defence, by witnesses, the media, broader cultural biases or beliefs (such as preconceptions about race) or the law itself.
34
Whilst the goal may be the production of a particular story, in practice whether such a story is successful or fails can rest less on its overarching narrative than on individual pieces of evidence or argument that act as lynchpins for the entire structure. Thus the court may spend considerable time examining one segment of the narrative, as much as it attends to the larger picture. Connell's orphan children after she killed her husband in order to elope with her paramour.
52
As well as a focus on an 'emotional public opinion' that surrounded female crime, the role of emotions in shaping courtroom narratives has been given some limited attention by historians. That reading the demeanour of defendants and witnesses was important to jury decision-making is well-recognized, even regarded as a key reason for the slow 'lawyerization' of the trial across the eighteenth century in England and Ireland. 53 Courtroom behaviour was understood to provide evidence of character, which in turn spoke to an individual's capacity or likelihood of being engaged in criminality or in testifying honestly.
54
In the later eighteenth and nineteenth century, character incorporated a 'mental, inner state' that defendants and witnesses at times tried to articulate for the court. 55 As I argue elsewhere however, nineteenth-century Irish audiences viewed character, including its psychological dimension, as physically manifested on and through the body, giving them confidence in using demeanour as legal evidence and ensuring that descriptions of bodies formed central components of journalistic descriptions of trials. 56 It was a focus on the body and emotion that perhaps enabled juries and the public to set aside their concerns about the role of the defence lawyer as a barrier between them and the increasingly silent defendant.
Given the importance of emotion and the body to trial reporting, female emotion (much more so than male) has not been ignored by historians. 57 To affirm his argument that female offenders were received more sympathetically than men in the nineteenth century,
Wiener describes the media response to Ann Barber's 'bitter and piercing' shrieks and 'heartrending cries' at execution; how Hannah Reid was 'pale and agitated, she could hardly stand', provoking sympathy in the judge; and that Mary Ann Higgins had 'an appearance of modesty and innocence about her which … excited strong feelings of interest and compassion towards her'.
58
Eleanor Gordon and Gwyneth Nair's account of the trial of Madeleine Smith (1857) is particularly noteworthy given its parallels to the Byrne case. Smith, a member of the Glasgow middle classes, was tried for poisoning her lover. Throughout the trial, Smith was described as 'composed', 'calm and unruffled, her gaze candid'; 'unmoved, cool, serene', 'nonchalant'.
Only when the account of her premarital sexual activity was discussed did she show any variation, flushing at one moment, going pale at another, and becoming 'saddened'. 59 As Gordon and Nair note, her emotions were not just of interest to the public but drawn into legal discussion. The prosecutor was compelled to address it, noting her great 'courage', but asserting that such courage was not inconsistent with guilt. Unsurprisingly then, femininity and emotion overlapped; emotions were gendered.
Women were expected to emote differently in court from men and in ways that conformed to broader expectations of female behaviour. In Irish courtrooms of the first half of the century, this was particularly marked by locating as mothers women who killed their husbands, a characterization that humanized them and confirmed their femininity despite their violence. It was a technique that drew attention to the emotions of the women on the stand, and was underpinned through similar sympathetic constructions of the criminal mother in the literature of the period. 60 When Anne Smith, the eleven-year-old daughter of Catherine Smith, was brought forward to testify to her mother's involvement in her father's murder, 'the prisoner … wept bitterly'. During testimony, the child burst into tears and could not proceed. 61 Catherine had killed her husband to elope with a lover; she had made several attempts to drown and choke him, before she and her lover beat him to death. She personally hit him repeatedly with stones as he died. It was a damning narrative provided by her lover for the court; the introduction of her child and both their tears softened Catherine's image after the details of her violence and drew out the tragedy of the case for the reader.
In a similar way, while Ellen Connell 'did not seem in the least affected during the trial', a damning indictment of her sensibility, on being sentenced to death she 'inquired for The scene was particularly moving; 'almost everyone was in tears', the judge wept and the jury 'entreated the removal of the child from the table'. The prisoner then fainted and a member of the jury had an 'apoplectic fit'. Needless to say, the child was not examined and the trial collapsed. Next day, after a retrial where the child did not testify, she was found guilty of manslaughter. Here a mother's emotions, and their contagious distribution across the court, disrupted court proceedings, not only complicating the prosecutor's narrative but stopping it. It was a disruption that brought the court together -judge, jury, 'almost everyone' -was impacted by this emotional scene. Rather than a mother's love acting as counter-narrative or as a single piece of evidence, it became the only narrative available to the court.
Conversely, a display of motherly emotion could disrupt proceedings by redirecting culpability towards a child witness. During Anne Cullen's testimony against her mother were backed by a cultural ideal of an innate maternal instinct to put her children first; her sorrow spoke to Anne's betrayal, not her own bad behaviour. That such conflict spoke poorly of the family, however, was affirmed through the reporter's comment that they were 'very illlooking characters'. Margaret and Bridget were acquitted.
Not all women successfully conformed to mainstream models for feminine emotion within court, limiting their capacity to evoke sympathy. As I have argued elsewhere, women who disrupted such ideals tended to be viewed more harshly and were treated with less respect by lawyers and judges. This was a particular problem for working-class women,
given that the passivity and delicacy of the ideal woman was not always achievable. 65 By the 1920s, the problem with gendered constructions of emotion was subject to overt debate in the press, with Lady Russell's failure to win in Russell v Russell argued to be the result of her refusal to show traditional feminine emotions. As one Sunday Express columnist noted:
'Supposing she had shed a few tears every time Marshall Hall [opposing barrister] went a bit rough? Supposing she had swooned from exhaustion? ... Supposing her lips had quivered whenever the baby was mentioned. … All women know the effect of tears and blushes and quivering lips on men'. Lady Russell's refusal to do so, it was argued, lost her case. At most, if emotion was visibly performed, such as an expressive display of rage, witnesses could convey their impression of another's feelings. This provided a space that could be filled either by prosecution and defence lawyers, or by an individual's behaviour in the courtroom.
In such instances, a woman's performance in the court acted as key evidence of how her pretrial behaviour should be interpreted by the court, as is suggested in the case of Madeleine
Smith.
The prosecution of Eleanor Ryan for her husband's murder provides a useful example of this, and is particularly notable as she was only one of five people tried for the crime.
Despite this, at least as represented in the news reports of the trial, it was Ryan, her body, behaviour and emotions, around which the narrative of the trial revolved. Most reports of the trial followed a similar structure, beginning with a description of Ryan, her person and general behaviour. 68 Some then gave a brief account of her co-defendant, Cusack, a clear villain in the narrative: 'a settled melancholy in his face, which was of a very dark and fiendish hue. He appeared quite unmoved during the trial, and when the verdict was announced, a sort of sneer of contempt quivered on his lips'. 69 The reports then gave opening speeches and witness testimony, occasionally interspersed with commentary on the defendants' emotional responses to events. The judge's charge was mentioned in one line, before the verdict was given. This was followed by the events that surrounded sentencing, a paragraph on Ryan's person and emotions, and a final section on the public response to the case.
Descriptions of Ryan at the outset of the trial noted that she was 'middle-aged', 'well looking, and, indeed, might claim a reasonable share of personal beauty'. She had born nine children, of whom three survived. In court, she dressed neatly in a new blue cloak, lined with silk and edged with fur. It was noted, 'she bore the trial with a good deal of firmness, yet she was repeatedly overwhelmed in tears'. Her emotions are not mentioned again until her sevenyear-old daughter is put on the stand. In contrast, the prisoner Patrick Lennane is recorded as having 'passionately exclaimed, "Go along you d-n-d perjurer"', when being identified by a witness. To avoid the emotional showdowns of other trials, the court 'contrived, that during her entire evidence she did not once see her mother'. Yet, when she left the stand, 'the unfortunate mother stretched across the other prisoners, to get a last view of her child, and when gone, she leaned upon the prisoner Hall, [???] and seemed to labour under the deepest suffering'. Only Lennane -the 'passionate' protestor -was acquitted of the crime, perhaps suggestive that his exclamation in court was compelling for the jury, as it was for the journalist who thought it important enough to record it.
On sentencing, the judge began with Ryan, noting she 'required all the repentance in her power, before she appeared at the judgment seat … sending, unprepared, to his last 69 Southern Reporter & Cork Commercial Courier, 15 March 1825. account, him whom she was bound and had sworn to cherish'. He also addressed her emotional state, noting 'he did not say this to aggravate her sufferings, or add to her miseries'. Ryan fainted on the pronouncement of the sentence and did not regain consciousness until later that night. The account given of Ryan after sentencing was more ambivalent, noting she was about 'twenty-eight years old… her face bore evident marks of extreme anxiety and depression of mind, which made her look considerably older'. 70 They also reported that she 'perspired copiously during the trial, and frequently wiped her face with a handkerchief. There was something like resignation to the fate which, she must have been confident, awaited her, in her whole demeanour'.
The testimony primarily revolved around descriptions of the murder itself, with
Cusack responsible for the physical violence, and Ryan acting as the decision-maker -she sent various people on errands, others to bed, fetched sheets to hide the body, and prevented Cusack from harming her child and her servant (who later testified against them). The others 'aided'. It was testimony that tempered Ryan's humane management of Cusack's violence with a mastery of the situation that belied any presentation of her as an innocent victim.
There was no motive given -the closest suggested was by the Roscommon & Leitrim
Gazetteer, which noted that Cusack was 'not supposed likely to win the affections of so interesting a woman as Mrs. Ryan', and the statement by the judge to Cusack that no one 'could shut their eyes on the fact, that it was owing to his seductions they had been brought to the situation in which they were then placed'. 71 As her mastery of the crime scene suggests, witness accounts do not describe her as emotional during the murder itself. If there was an emotional demeanour suggested, it was calm and control, rather than passion.
70 Ibid.
71 Roscommon & Leitrim Gazette, 19 March 1825; Southern Reporter & Cork Commercial Courier, 15 March 1825.
As the surviving account of the trial is an incomplete recording of events, some of which, such as witness testimony and Ryan's emotional responses, ran parallel to each other but were told sequentially, it is methodologically problematic to use its structure as a direct representation of the narrative structure of the trial itself. Yet, as the purpose of such accounts was generally to convey to readers the reason why a particular verdict was reached, that the account fills the explanatory gaps in the trial evidence with Ryan's emotions on the stand perhaps reflects similar dynamics within the courtroom itself. From this, it can be argued that the opening affirmation of Ryan's composure, 'she bore the trial with a good deal of firmness', and its subsequent deterioration, through emotional distress at a daughter's testimony, to a conclusion that her resignation to her fate had been marked on her body throughout, perhaps tells a story of how Ryan's emotions -or at least how it was read by others -evolved over the trial in light of testimony. As her composure failed, her anxiety aged her, her sweat demonstrated her concern, and her resignation became evident, so her guilt became apparent. Ryan's body provided emotional evidence of guilt that helped temper the absence of motive and explanation found in the trial testimony itself. Ryan's emotions became an intertwining narrative that supported the prosecutor's case.
IV. MRS ELLEN BYRNE
Mrs Byrne first appeared in a court 'filled to the ceiling' on Friday 12 August 1842, having passed through streets 'choked up with anxious crowds', 'thronged, almost to suffocation'. On Monday 15 August 1842, the court 'was crowded to excess, and the greatest anxiety was manifested to hear proceedings'. Taken from gaol, Mrs Byrne was conducted to the dock by the son of the gaol's governor, 'on whose arm she leaned', and provided with a seat (a custom reserved for women). She wore a suit of the 'deepest weeds' in the most modern fashion, with a double veil of dense crepe that 'rendered her face almost invisible', reflecting as Lacey notes 'an appropriate feminine reluctance to submit to the public gaze'.
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In her hand, she held a rich bouquet of flowers, like other prominent female defendants of the period. 75 She walked into the dock with 'a firm, unbroken step; and on no moment, except perhaps at the moment when the indictment was being read, did she exhibit the slightest The trial lasted two days. The first day, which ran from ten a.m. to six-thirty p.m., was taken up by the crown's case. Apart from closing speeches, the second day was for the defence. The jury went out at quarter to four in the afternoon and returned with a verdict in half an hour. The crown opened the case with an indictment that specified that Eleanor Byrne murdered Augustine by strangling and choking him to death; there were ten counts each suggesting a method of strangulation, using her hands or different materials in the room. One count suggested she beat him to death.
The case that was constructed told a story of a couple, who if not habitually drunk, every few months locked themselves away in one of the couple's two bedrooms, and drank themselves into a stupor from which they would emerge a week to ten days later. Perhaps unwilling to lose the sympathy of the jury by being too insulting to a delicate female, however, he then pulled his punches. When describing the couple's drunken behaviour, he apologized, noting 'Of course, you will understand that her habits or her general character are not in the slightest degree to prejudice her in your estimation'. He referred to them only as they were material to the case, and to her defence, and thus 'I am not guilty of any unfairness towards her'. 80 He repeatedly referred to 'fairness' to the prisoner when describing the legal evidence. On summing up, he tried to raise the disgust of the jury by noting that 'you will not let the indignation, the just indignation which you may feel at the bestiality and grossness of the life of this woman, sway you in deciding her guilt or innocence'. He also addressed the 'enormity' of the crime: 'There can be nothing so horrible as for a man to meet his death by the hand of his sworn partner, more horrible, if senseless and helpless, she takes advantage of his inability to resist her'. Yet, given that these final statements were coupled with requests to be fair and convict on evidence, and that it lacked the key rhetorical markers used by orators of the period to sway audiences, it was not the most exciting of speeches (even for Brewster who had a rather bloodless style of oratory).
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The testimony was detailed and tedious. The appearance of Mrs Byrne's sons, and particularly her ten-year-old, who called Mr Byrne 'dada', provided a moment of interest but the precise accounting of comings and goings from the bedroom was mostly technical. The medical evidence was lengthy and ambiguous. The experts, some of the most prestigious physicians in Ireland, were happy to make general conclusions, but unwilling to swear conclusively to what happened. They provided complex medical detail, compared the body with an array of other bodies found similarly decomposed, and even read passages from medical textbooks by the leading thinkers. Brewster needed a common sense reading of the evidence -it was unlikely that a badly composed body died recently; some of the marks suggested violence; that she hid the body for so long suggested guilt. The medical experts, caught up in their technicalities, were unwilling to make such statements without embedding them in caveats and conditions.
It was also a case that the prosecution wished to hang on a lack of emotion. In his opening remarks, Brewster had argued that there were only two interpretations of the evidence: that Mrs Byrne had committed murder, or that she was innocent. Manslaughter was 81 For a discussion of differences in rhetoric between the speeches of lawyers for the prosecution and the defence, see: Katie Barclay, Sympathetic Speech: Telling Truths in the Byrne needed to be presented as cold and capable of premeditated murder. The only discussion of her emotional state was after she was told he was dead, when she cried 'O, no, no!', and her behaviour in the days after the event. The coroner noted when he came to the house that she appeared to suffer from an 'aberration of mind', although to a 'stranger she might appear collected'. 84 A friend of her husband who visited the next day thought that she was 'sober but frightened; she trembled'. 85 The result was a passionless murder. that led to this prosecution. He noted that in the case of a crime so 'abhorrent to the natural feelings of our nature, the more improbable it is that it has been perpetrated', before laying out the ambiguities created by the evidence thus far. He then spoke to the key missing element of the prosecution's case: motive, and a motive understood in emotional terms. He detailed a history of a marriage 'lived upon good terms', except at moments of drunkenness:
82 For discussion of law of manslaughter see: W. E. Vaughan, Murder Trials in Ireland 1836-
